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APPKT.T.AKFT ' fi REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant, Julie Turner ("Turner"), respectfully submits this 
Brief in reply to the brief of Appellee Amy Nelson ("Nelson"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Utah's comparative negligence statute is unique among its 
counterparts in sister states. While it retains many of the 
theoretical underpinnings of sister statutes, it applies them in a 
more reasoned and even-handed manner to negligence actions in Utah. 
Utah was by far the last of the Pacific region states to enact 
a comparative negligence statute. As such, it enjoyed the benefits 
of other states' successes and failures, and was able to 
incorporate the wisdom of other states' judicial interpretations 
into its comparative negligence scheme. 
This scheme, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 - 43, 
embodies the Utah Legislature's considered decision to restrict the 
apportionment of negligence to parties to the action. Underlying 
this decision are several important policy considerations. 
The first, and foremost, consideration is fairness to all 
parties to the litigation. By restricting the apportionment of 
negligence to parties, the statute encourages the joinder of all 
potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial litigation, 
which in turn ensures that no defendant will be liable for more 
than her share of fault. 
The statute encourages joinder by allocating the burden of 
joining ^ t responsible defendant to the party wishing to apportion 
negligence. This in turn ensures that all responsible parties will 
be present to protect their interests, and further ensures that 
fault will be allocated realistically and fairly in an adversarial 
proceeding. Defendants are thus protected from paying more than 
their proportionate share of liability and Plaintiffs are protected 
from the inequity of a disproportionate and unenforceable judgment 
against an "empty chair." 
The statute also promotes judicial economy. By encouraging 
joinder of all potentially responsible parties in the initial 
litigation, it prevents multiple and successive litigation by 
plaintiffs seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for 
which a jury may find them theoretically responsible. 
Utah's comparative negligence statute represents a unique 
legislative balancing of competing policy objectives. It is the 
duty of this Court to protect and preserve that balance. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ADDITION OF THE NON-PARTY CITY TO THE 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM THE DAY OF TRIAL WAS ERROR 
A. Turner's Objection is not Moot 
Nelson's first argument is that Turner's objection to the 
addition of the non-party City to the verdict form the day of trial 
is "moot" because Nelson was found to have no negligence by the 
jury. Nelson's argument is circular and without merit. 
The doctrine of "mootness" requires that an actual controversy 
exist at all stages of appellate review, and not simply on the date 
the action is initiated. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 
705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). A justiciable controversy clearly 
exists between Turner and Nelson, arising from Nelson's collision 
with Turner after running a stop sign on July 6, 1989, which is 
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capable of review and decision by this Court. Turner's claim 
plainly is not "moot." 
Nelson's claim that the addition of the non-party City the day 
of trial was of "no consequence" is disingenuous at best and 
similarly meritless. "Even if Salt Lake City had not been on the 
verdict form, defendant would have made the same argument, claiming 
that she was free of fault because the stop sign could not be 
seen." Nelson's Brief, at 12. Nelson's opening statement to the 
jury, however, impugns this assertion: 
I think the real fault here that — we're suggesting is with 
Salt Lake City. It's a bad design. They didn't have it well 
signed. 
(R. 376)(emphasis added). Nelson argued that the City's negligent 
design, not her own alleged freedom from negligence, was the cause 
of the accident. It is difficult to imagine the same argument 
being made if the City were not on the verdict form. 
The trial transcript clearly demonstrates that Nelson's 
primary defense was the alleged negligence of the "empty chair" 
City, not her alleged "freedom from negligence." Nelson's claim 
that the addition of the City "was of no consequence" is clearly 
without merit. 
Nelson's reliance upon Beitzel v. City of Coeur d' Alene, 827 
P. 2d 1160 (Idaho 1992), is misplaced. In Beitzel, the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to include unnamed 
non-parties on the verdict form. The court held that because the 
jury had found the plaintiff not to be negligent, any non-party 
negligence would not serve to reduce the plaintiff's recovery 
because Idaho's comparative negligence statutes require 
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apportionment only when there negligence attributable to the person 
recovering. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). 
Beitzel is thus inapplicable because (1) the jury never 
reached the question of Turner's negligence, if any; and (2) 
Idaho's comparative negligence scheme operates differently than 
Utah's. Beitzel further does not apply by analogy, because 
comparative negligence statutes do not treat plaintiffs and 
defendants similarly. 
The court's opinion in Beitzel is, however, instructive. It 
clearly demonstrates that even Idaho, the jurisdiction upon which 
Nelson relies so heavily for support, recognizes that non-parties 
may be excluded from negligence apportionment in appropriate 
circumstances. Ld.; Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 758 P.2d 
704 (Idaho 1988). The Beitzel court also recognizes the policies 
of fairness to plaintiffs ("any negligence of the non-party could 
not serve to lessen the award to the plaintiffs") and of 
encouraging joinder of non-parties to the action ("[t]he verdict 
would not have been binding on the unnamed [non]party, in any 
event."). Id. at 1164-65. 
The trial court's inclusion of the non-party City on the 
verdict form and as a "party" at trial clearly and conclusively 
altered the posture and presentation of the case below. It 
permitted the jury to assign all liability to an unrepresented 
"ghost" party, a party the jury knew could not and would not be 
bound by its verdict. Without the City present to protect its 
interests and to provide a truly adversarial atmosphere, Nelson was 
permitted to foist her liability upon an absent, unrepresented 
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party, thus denying Turner a fair trial. The court's decision was 
prejudicial and clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
B. Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute Cannot Be Construed 
Without Reference to S 78-27-41 
Both parties agree that the interpretation of § 78-27-41 is 
the key to this appeal. Section 78-27-41 provides: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to 
the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may 
have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which 
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having determined their 
respective of fault. 
Id. § 78-27-41 (emphasis supplied). Nelson argues that § 78-27-41 
represents merely a "strategic option" to be employed by litigants 
when, and if, it serves their purposes. Nelson's Brief, at 14-15. 
Turner, conversely, asserts that § 78-27-41 represents an integral 
component of the comparative negligence scheme enacted by the Utah 
Legislature that requires joinder of a defendant as a prerequisite 
to apportionment of her alleged negligence. 
Utah's well-settled rules of statutory construction clearly 
support the latter position. When construing a statute, all words 
are presumed to have been used advisedly by the legislature, and 
the construction of a statute which gives effect to all of its 
provisions is favored. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 
(Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)(emphasis 
added) . Further, statutes in Utah are not to be severed and 
considered piecemeal, but must be given effect in their entirety 
whenever possible. Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City School 
Dist.. 377 P.2d 490 (Utah 1962)(emphasis supplied). 
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legislative balance struck between considerations of tort reform, 
fairness to litigants and judicial economy. 
Nelson focuses upon the use of the word "may" in § 78-27-41, 
and argues that it makes joinder optional. As this Court has 
previously held, however, use of a traditionally permissive word in 
a statute does not automatically render it permissive within the 
context of the statute: 
There is no universal rule by which directory provisions may, 
under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are 
mandatory. The intention of the legislature, however, should 
be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word form 
should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative 
intent. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 
1978)(citing 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 25.03, at 299-
300 (4th Ed.)) (emphasis added). In the context of the Act, joinder 
under § 78-27-41 is only mandatory when a party seeks to have a 
non-party's negligence apportioned. The Legislature's use of the 
word "may" in § 78-27-41 thus embodies both a directory and a 
mandatory connotation. 
Nelson also argues that non-parties* negligence must be 
permitted to be apportioned in order to maintain the "purity" of 
the comparative negligence scheme. Several sister states have 
considered, and expressly rejected, this argument on a variety of 
grounds. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987); Warmbrodt v. 
Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 1984); National Farmers Union 
Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 
1983)(En Banc). 
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from Idaho, Kansas or Oklahoma .-4 schemes makes neither less 
oHeei i \/<i-1 "' i" lii pru'i-iv - tnu&tr states" statutes. 
Utah's scheme assigns the burde, fining a defendant tortfeasor 
* *- party wishing * •.> hav- :•.. defendant tortfeasor's negligence 
method of ensuring 
bot that responsible parties are represented .u fiidJ, and 
that * . parties are treated fairly. 
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a party's inability to acquire jurisdiction over a joi nt tortfeasor 
(the "practical realities" of modern lawsuits) forcing that party 
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injuries. Nelson*s hypotheticals are unavailing. Clearly, 
'"'•'"I'' i suiiiuient to subject a 
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jurisdictional reach equitable to require the 
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Supreme Court stated: 
Nelson's reliance upon Oklahoma case law for support is 
misplaced, since Oklahoma retains joint and several 
liability as a feature of its comparative negligence scheme. 
£•<?•# Anderson v. O'Donoahue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983), 
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[A] comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may 
work to defeat any recovery by a deserving plaintiff . • . the 
plaintiff's claim against tortfeasors named as defendants 
should not be compromised in cases where the identity of an 
absent tortfeasors [sic] is unknown, such as the "phantom" in 
a three car hit-and-run accident. By requiring the jury to 
apportion 100 percent of the negligence among the parties, the 
burden of persuading the factfinder to resolve the comparative 
negligence equation is shared equally between the plaintiffs 
and the tortfeasors who participate in the trial. 
* * * * * 
[I]t is preferable to place the burden of finding and suing 
absent tortfeasors on those who caused plaintiff to suffer 
damages. 
National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackeltonf 662 
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983). 
In § 78-27-41 the Utah Legislature has chosen to allocate the 
burden of finding and suing absent tortfeasors upon the party 
wishing to apportion those tortfeasors' negligence. This Court 
should enforce the Legislature's choice by giving effect to § 78-
27-41 and reversing and remanding the trial court's decision below. 
C. The Addition of the Non-Party City the Day of Trial Was 
Manifestly Prejudicial 
In her Brief, Nelson asserts that Turner was not prejudiced by 
the addition of the non-party City the day of trial. In support of 
this assertion, Nelson argues that she claimed all along that the 
stop sign in question was partially obstructed and "not properly 
visible." Nelson further claims that the presence of the City did 
not alter the nature, presentation or outcome of the case. 
Turner was prejudiced in three fundamental ways by the 
addition of the non-party City: (1) She was given inadequate 
notice and opportunity to prepare for the addition of a new party 
and new issues to the litigation; (2) She was improperly forced at 
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was denied recovery for her Injuries. 
1. Inadequate Notice 
T i .^ - - j * • -.- < * . a b e 
litigating * - issue c t .*- * nj.r <• , na . r ; \ alleged negligence. 
The additioii ui 
statements *r<=> m, 
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I -
pleadi, j> 
the time ::: * t; 
f 
motions ai -
justicp, ann *:-
r 
] - . ; 
party moments before opening 
required that amendments 
i„ 
1
 : • *! apposing party. Girard v. Appleby , 
ouiL tiaz> 
construed *<= *-^  furthe. 
subjected * , j , ?ei scrutiny when 
^.llmai I v . Hai lsei I
 t "1 !NI > v u tah 
a Gi.. :. :he Court affirmed the *>}.-* • -irt s denial 
motio: : = • amend ; o add new causes 
Court based its affirmance upon the plaintiff's inabilj^ state 
ri! ide jiidito leason fun 1 IK* untimeliness • * the m o t i o n , and upon the 
disadvantage and surprise to the defendant, stating thai ""I'I.H 
interests of justice will best served by the court's denial t 
J
 J"J'4 JyliJik\r\II...v.A Brinkerhof f 
P.2d 1132 (1936 Iso Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. i 
1189, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(Proper standard for * judge 
considering I i 
be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for 
I ii 
which he had not time to prepare") . Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn. 
746 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals affirmed 
the denial of a motion to add a third party defendant made two 
weeks before trial where "inadequate reasons for the untimely 
motion were presented . . . ." Id. at 7 98. 
Nelson has wholly failed to present an adequate reason for the 
timing of her motion to add the City. Nelson alone knew that the 
City was a proper party to the lawsuit from the day she was served. 
Her answer to Turner's complaint alleges that Turner's injuries 
were "caused by the negligence of third parties." Nelson never 
identified a third party, however, until six (6) days before trial. 
Nelson clearly made a conscious "strategic" decision to "lay 
behind the log" until the week of trial before naming the City as 
a potentially responsible party. This was an admirably clever bit 
of lawyering on Nelson's part in the grand tradition of the Perry 
Mason "surprise witness." It proved to be remarkably successful. 
Trial by ambush, however, was abolished in 1937 with the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules "shall be 
liberally construed to secure the lust, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
This Court has consistently required that the addition of parties 
shortly before or at trial be fair to the opposing party. Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). The addition of the City the 
day of trial was neither fair to Turner nor just, and was clearly 
prejudicial. The trial court's decision should be reversed. 
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2. Proving the Negative 
By allowing the City to be added to the verdict form, the 
trial court improperly put Turner in the position of having to 
prove a negative, i.e.f the City's non-negligence, in order to 
recover for her injuries. In effect the trial court shifted the 
burden of proof. As the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "it is 
unfair to saddle the plaintiff with the burden of litigating 
liability issues of a non-party or to try the absent tortfeasor in 
absentia under conditions which could not bind that person under 
principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel." Frackelton, 662 
P.2d at 1060. 
3. Denial of Recovery 
The greatest prejudice caused by the addition of the non-party 
City the day of trial was the denial of any recovery by plaintiff 
for her injuries. By shifting the focus from her own actions to 
the City's alleged negligent design or signing of the intersection, 
Nelson escaped liability for Turner's injuries, injuries which 
Nelson indisputably caused. This result could not have been 
reached under the facts of this case but for the presence of the 
City both on the verdict form and as an "empty chair" at trial. 
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this precise result under 
principles of equity and fairness to the plaintiff: 
[A] comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may 
work to defeat any recovery by a deserving plaintiff . . . the 
plaintiff's claim against tortfeasors named as defendants 
should not be compromised . . . By requiring the jury to 
apportion 100 percent of the negligence among the parties, the 
burden of persuading the factfinder to resolve the comparative 
negligence equation is shared equally between the plaintiffs 
and the tortfeasors who participate in the trial. 
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Id. 
The jury's verdict is probably the best evidence of the 
prejudice caused by the addition of the City the day of trial. 
Nelson would seemingly have the Court believe that it was the City, 
not Nelson, who ran the stop sign and broadsided Turner. Had the 
court properly refused to add the City, the jury would have 
apportioned fault solely between Turner and Nelson. It is 
indisputable that, under the facts presented at trial, Nelson would 
have borne a substantial percentage, if not the entirety, of the 
liability for Turner's damages. The prejudice to Turner is clear 
and unequivocal. 
Because the jury below was prevented from reaching the issue 
of whether Turner was in any way negligent, the Court should 
reverse the trial court and grant Turner a new trial in which the 
jury can apportion negligence between the plaintiff and the 
tortfeasor who participated in the trial, Turner and Nelson. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY WAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Nelson's reliance upon the principle of "surprise" as a ground 
for refusing Turner's proffered rebuttal evidence is indeed curious 
and ironic. The pot has called the proverbial kettle "black." 
Contrary to Nelson's assertions, Turner was not required in 
her case in chief to prove that the stop sign was "unobstructed." 
Turner was required to prove that Nelson ran a stop sign, and that 
Nelson's negligence was the proximate cause of Turner's injuries. 
In Rodriguez v. Olin Corp., 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1986) , the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that a plaintiff only bears 
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the burden of proving a prima facie case, and is not required to 
"prove the negative" of defendant's facts or theories: 
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has the 
right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to establish 
its prima facie case and is under no obligation to anticipate 
and negate in its own case in chief any facts or theories that 
may be raised on defense. 
Id.; accord, Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964)(Rebuttal 
evidence is designed to meet facts not raised prior to the 
defendant's case in chief, not facts which could have been raised). 
In its decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations 
governing the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. The court 
held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed where "new" testimony 
is presented during defendant's case in chief. The court stated 
that 
Logic and fairness lead us to conclude that new evidence for 
purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand new." Rather, 
evidence is new if, under all the facts and circumstances, the 
court concludes that the evidence was not fairly and 
adequately presented to the trier of fact before the 
defendant's case in chief. 
Id. at 496. 
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly proper 
rebuttal evidence that should have been admitted by the trial 
court. It was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop 
sign was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of Nelson's 
expert, who testified that, due to the obstruction, Nelson could 
not reasonably have been aware that she needed to stop. Nelson and 
her expert's testimony was unquestionably "new" evidence which 
Turner was under no obligation to anticipate and negate in her case 
-14-
in chief. Rodriguez, 780 F.2d at 496. The fact that Nakling was 
not included on pretrial Turner's witness list is irrelevant in the 
context of rebuttal. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that the substance o£ Nakling's 
testimony had not adequately been presented to the jury prior to 
Nelson's case in chief. See id.; see also Everett v. S.H. Parks & 
Associates, Inc., 697 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff's 
rebuttal evidence "was not truly relevant until [defendant] 
presented its defense"). Turner was thus effectively prevented 
from offering any evidence that the sign was not obstructed. The 
trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling from 
testifying. 
Finally, Nelson states in her Brief that 
The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and most 
states of the United States are intended to provide each party 
with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at 
trial. To allow one side to use a witness that was not 
revealed . . . jeopardizes the other party's trial preparation 
and should not be permitted. 
Nelson's Brief, at 24. We could not have said it better. Had both 
parties to this appeal been accorded the fairness embodied in this 
paragraph, this case would not be before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in 
Turner's Brief in Chief, Turner respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse and remand this case with instructions to grant 
Turner a new trial as to all issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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